Enhancing cyber resilience in offshore wind
Johan Rambi and Klaas Bruinsma of RambiCo are bringing companies in the Dutch offshore wind sector together to share security information and work more closely on cyber resilience. The assignment comes from the Field Lab Energy Cyber Security (FLECS) and builds on a 2022 exploration by TKI Offshore Energy and Energy InnovationNL.
Offshore wind is hard to secure: wind farms are mostly operated remotely, and a long chain of developers, suppliers, installers and maintenance companies each holds part of the responsibility. Ransomware at turbine suppliers has already delayed projects.
Within six months, a core group of eight to twelve parties, including grid operator TenneT and wind farm owners, is set to agree how they will collaborate. Sensitive information is handled under the Traffic Light Protocol, so trust can grow. The participants decide the scope; RambiCo facilitates, with experience from the European Energy-ISAC.
One view on IT and OT: building an integrated cyber defence centre
In many organisations the security operations centre watches office IT closely, while production systems stay out of sight. Attacks rarely respect that boundary. They usually start in IT and work their way towards the systems that run the plant. At FrieslandCampina I support the CastleGuard programme, which is setting up an enterprise cyber defence centre for integrated IT/OT security monitoring.
What it takes in practice
Know what you have. OT asset visibility comes first. You cannot spot unusual behaviour in a network you have not mapped, and many production networks have grown over decades.
Listen, don’t probe. Industrial systems can react badly to active scanning. Passive monitoring of network traffic gives visibility without risk to production.
Write use cases with the plant. Detection rules only work when process engineers help define what normal looks like. A setpoint change at night means something different on a dairy line than on an office laptop.
Agree who acts. An alert on a production line needs an owner in operations, not only in IT, and a playbook that weighs safety and continuity before isolation.
Choose and onboard the MSSP with care. At Kenter I wrote the security requirements for the MSP and MSSP tenders and led the MSSP onboarding. The lesson: put OT knowledge, escalation routes and reporting in the contract, and test them before go-live.
The reward is one risk picture for the board, instead of two partial ones.
Trilateral MoU signing at GridSecCon
On 17 October 2018, at GridSecCon in Las Vegas, Johan Rambi signed the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the US E-ISAC, Japan’s JE-ISAC and EE-ISAC, on behalf of the EE-ISAC chair and board. It was the culmination of an idea he had been pursuing since starting the DENSEK project in 2013: a genuinely global model for sharing energy-sector cyber security intelligence, rather than one confined to a single continent.
Representing EE-ISAC at the UCSI working group
On 9 and 10 July, Johan Rambi attended the third meeting of the Utility Cyber Security Initiative in Tbilisi, as EE-ISAC’s representative. UCSI was established by USAID and the United States Energy Association together with utilities across the Black Sea region, to strengthen cyber security cooperation beyond Europe’s own borders.